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POST-SOCIALIST BANK CRISES AND THE  




Bank crises have become a common feature of economic life worldwide 
in the 1980s and 1990s, engulfing the banking systems of Chile, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Thailand, the Philippines, Spain, the U.S., Japan 
and Turkey, among others. 
 
Bank crises are usually the result of dramatic swings in the value of 
assets held by the banking system. When asset values fall relative to 
liabilities, banks net worth is eroded, resulting in crisis. Minsky (1977) 
argues that such asset devaluations are a normal feature of the 
business cycle in market economies. As confidence builds during the 
business cycle, more and more agents engage in speculative finance, 
creating an increasingly fragile financial structure. Adverse movements 
in interest rates at the top of the business cycle can make these 
positions untenable, leading to financial crisis. Kindleburger (1978), in 
his historical retrospective on financial crises, emphasizes the role of 
shifts in confidence at the peak of the cycle. Financial crisis, he 
contends, is precipitated by a self-fulfilling perception that the market 
has hit its peak. 
 
Recent bank crises have included another theme: the role of 
deregulation. In many cases, bank crises have followed the lifting of 
regulations previously enacted precisely in order to maintain stable 
conditions in the banking industry. Deregulation creates new profit-
making opportunities while devaluing others. This leads to financial 
crisis both because of the devaluation of old assets and because of the 
euphoric swing into new assets, which tends to overshoot.1 
                                                          
1 An important question about recent banking crises in market economies. then, is 
whether deregulation is the cause of banking crises, and, if so, whether the 
beneficial effects of liberalization are outweighed by the costs of hank crisis. 
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This picture of the causes and origins of bank crises has to be 
reformulated before it can be applied to the former Communist 
countries. Under the old system, banks were "repressed" to a far 
greater extent than in regulated market economies. Credit allocation 
was determined by plan/political requirements, and repayment of 
obligations was erratic. Under this "soft-budget constraint", banks 
accumulated large portfolios of non-performing loans, failed to master 
the art of assessing credit risk, and failed to develop either the financial 
structures or business practices needed in a market economy. 
 
Because of this, the transition to market economy in and of itself 
implied that this hidden banking crisis would come into the open. 
Furthermore, changes in the composition of demand, exacerbated by 
the end of planning and the withdrawal of government subsidies, 
radically changed the profitability of individual projects and the relative 
values of assets. These shifts, coupled with unfavorable shocks coming 
from stabilization programs and disintegration of trade networks such 
as COMECON and the market of ex-Yugoslavia, in some cases led to 
large-scale bank crises. 
 
To make matters more complicated, this bank crisis befell banks that 
were poorly prepared to function in a market context. These banks now 
had to learn credit appraisal, provisioning, competition for deposits, and 
all the other business practices of capitalist banking. Furthermore, the 
Central Banks of post-communist countries, having previously relied on 
such mechanisms as direct allocation of credit, now had to create 
appropriate instruments for controlling the money supply and for 
supervising and regulating independent banking entities. 
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Because of the complex environment within which it occurred, post-
Communist bank crises were (and are) significantly different than such 
crises in market economies. Post-Communist bank crises are not the 
result of temporary euphoria, nor are they the consequences of 
deregulation-induced excesses.2 Instead, they are the consequence of 
long-standing institutional arrangements from the old system. Only 
deep institutional changes can solve post-Communist bank crises. 
These institutional changes, however, have to occur simultaneously 
with bank crisis, itself occurring in the midst of the "transition 
depression" as well as the restructuring/privatization of the real sector. 
 
The reward for institution-building in the banking sector will be, first 
and foremost, greater allocative efficiency. Healthy, market-oriented 
banks will play a major role in the rational use of funds. Moreover, such 
banks will allow investment to be made by private firms and 
entrepreneurs, rather than mainly by the government (whether directly 
through the government budget or indirectly via political pressure on 
banks).3 
Rehabilitation of individual banks plays a key role because the burden 
of bad loans in the banking system prevents banks from functioning 
normally. Banks with large stocks of non-preforming loans are forced to 
service their "bad" customers, since the only hope of collecting 
anything from these loans is to help the client survive. Meanwhile, the 
                                                          
2 Of course, the next financial crisis in post-Communist could be due to speculative 
excesses. 
3 The "financial repression" school has argued that restrictions on banks depress 
the level of savings, and thereby the level of investment (McKinnon (1973), Shaw 
(1973)). However, socialist economies showed high investment rates when 
measured by investmenboutput, but low levels of investment efficiency. In this 
sense, the "financial repression" argument about investment is simply not relevant 
here.  
Regarding savings, the evidence from developing economies on the relationship 
between financial repression and savings rates is unclear (see Velasco, (1991) and 
Giovannini, (1985)). Furthermore, in socialist economies, the monetary overhang 
and forced savings are usually considered problems, not a lack of savings. 
For these reasons, I place emphasis on healthy banks as raising investment 
efficiency, and do not consider effects on the level of aggregate savings or 
investment. 
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high costs of these loans are passed on to "good" customers, raising 
deposit-lending spreads and depressing economic activity in the rest of 
the economy. 
 
Where the bad loan problem is not too big, decentralized means of 
solving the problem may be pursued. For example, in Poland, banks 
were given explicit instructions about how to treat bad loans, and were 
faced with firm deadlines for dealing with the loans The banks 
themselves, however, had to resolve the problems. 
 
But when the bad loan problem reaches a critical point, systemic risk 
becomes too great, and government is forced to remove the bad loans 
from the banking sector. Such a critical point was reached in Slovenia 
and Croatia, where bad loans ranged as high as 30-40% of assets. 
 
Since, as Borak (1994) points out, government plays a central role both 
in organizing and financing rehabilitation and in assuming temporary 
ownership and management of banks, it faces important choices. 
Should the banks themselves be entrusted with the workout of the bad 
loans? Considering the negative experiences of former Yugoslavia, 
Turkey, Chile and others with ownership of banks by real sector firms, 
what restrictions should be placed on cross-ownership? How can bank 
rehabilitation be combined with privatization, considering that debt 
write-offs are often an important feature of privatization? These 
questions will be considered below. 
 
Bank rehabilitation has a high opportunity cost, both in terms of the 
demands it puts on the government budget, and in terms of its 
requirements for skilled personnel. Nonetheless, there are strong 
reasons for undertaking bank rehabilitation as early as possible in the 
transition. For one thing, if banks are left with a large stock of non-
performing assets, they will be forced to charge high rates on loans to 
paying customers, which will depress investment For another, if 
enterprises are rehabilitated before banks, there will be a temptation to 
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write-off debts without consideration of the eventual effect on the 
banking system. 
 
Bank rehabilitation has two fundamental prerequisites' bringing inflation 
under control,4 and progress in restructuring and adjustment in the 
real-sector. Controlling inflation is crucial because otherwise funds 
spent on recapitalization are immediately devalued; restructuring and 
adjustment are crucial to creating a sound customer base and avoiding 
new flow problems. 
 
This paper will examine bank crises and rehabilitation efforts in Slovenia 
and Croatia. These cases provide an interesting contrast, since the two 
countries began with the same institutional legacy from former 
Yugoslavia, but, partly due to differing political and military 
circumstances, have followed different paths. Also, both countries have 
been rather successful in macroeconomic stabilization. Evidence 
introduced below points to important similarities in the two countries' 
banking crises, including the significant role of distress borrowing in 
demand for credit. At the same time, the cases strongly support the 
contention that real sector adjustment and restructuring--even without 
privatization--are crucial to the success of bank rehabilitation. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the institutional background of 
Yugoslav banking, which shaped the initial conditions for Slovene and 
Croat banks, is outlined. Second, a brief examination of stabilization 
efforts and economic trends, including the emergence of bank crisis, is 
offered. Third, the reform efforts of both countries are examined. 
Fourth, the relationship between bank rehabilitation and real sector 
restructuring and privatization is discussed. Fifth and last are 
concluding observations. 
                                                          
4 As I will discuss below, an alternative is to avoid bank rehabilitation altogether, 
relying on high inflation and bank privatization to consolidate the banking system. 
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Background: Banking in ex-Yugoslavia 
 
Slovenia and Croatia are in a favorable position compared to some 
former Communist countries in that commercial banks have been 
separated from the Central Bank for almost three decades. Socialist 
Yugoslavia introduced a two-tier banking system in the 1960s. 
 
Yugoslav banks had a great deal of operational autonomy, and much 
experience dealing directly with Western banks. Unfortunately, they 
also functioned in a legal and institutional environment that severely 
weakened them. A strict interpretation of Marxian theory was 
institutionalized, according to which banks did not actually create profit, 
but only redistributed it. To prevent banks from "exploiting" the 
productive economy, banks were not allowed to make profits; any 
surpluses were distributed to the real-sector enterprises who founded 
the bank. Profits could not be used to create reserves or provisions, 
either. The founders of Yugoslav banks were their main loan customers, 
creating a built-in conflict of interest. 
 
Furthermore, interest rates were set below inflation rates. Banks also 
assumed exchange rate risk, frequently ending up with open foreign 
exchange positions. This occurred either because the banks sold foreign 
currency deposited by households to enterprises, or because banks lent 
the proceeds of hard-currency loans from abroad in local currency 
(Mates 1986, 1989). 
 
On top of this, banks were under enormous political pressures to lend 
without rigorous assessment of credit risk. Such pressures created an 
environment of extremely loose banking practices. 
 
These practices were made possible by the availability of bail-outs from 
the Central Bank. The National Bank of Yugoslavia ratified the soft-
money policy created by political and economic agents throughout the 
system. The banks were regularly rescued from the losses resulting 
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from exchange rate depreciation, creating an enormous parafiscal debt 
(called "The Black Hole in the National Bank" (Mates, 1986)). 
 
In addition, banks were given so-called "documentary credits" 
(sometimes referred to as "selective rediscounting"--see Dyker (1992)): 
once they showed documents proving they had loaned money to 
designated priority sectors, they were granted National Bank of 
Yugoslavia credits at the discount rate, which was negative in real 
terms. By this means, banks could always gain as much liquidity as they 
wanted. The only control the National Bank of Yugoslavia maintained 
was the ceiling on commercial banks' credit, but usually these ceilings 
were set high enough that they had no limiting effect. (See Mates 
(1986), Škreb (1994) and Jankov (1994) for more details). 
 
THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
In 1989, as part of its efforts to move towards a market economy, the 
government refounded banks as joint-stock companies. Banks were 
audited in 1990, and bad loans were found to be 30% of total assets 
(Grličkov, 1990). But the ensuing political chaos prevented any real 
resolution of the bad debt problems. 
 
After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June 1991, their 
economies were hit by the effects of war, the break-up of Yugoslav 
institutions, and the collapse of the Yugoslav market. In the case of 
Croatia, which found 28% of its territory occupied by the end of 1991, 
the war meant a fall in GDP of perhaps a third. 
 
In addition, all the foreign exchange reserves of Yugoslavia were taken 
by the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The National Banks of Slovenia and 
Croatia had no reserves to speak of after June 1991.5 
                                                          
5 Commercial banks did have some foreign exchange holdings--approximately $200 
million in the case of Croatia. 
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The government of Yugoslavia had already frozen citizens' hard-
currency accounts on April 27. Both governments assumed the burden 
of these liabilities as public debt--a first step towards rehabilitating the 
banking system.6 
 
As the crisis unfolded and trade among the ex-Yugoslav republics 
shriveled, liquidity problems multiplied. Bad debts rose rapidly, reaching 
about 40% of assets in Slovenia in 1992 (Cvikl, Kraft and Vodopivec, 
1993). In both countries, inter-enterprise arrears also grew rapidly. In 
Croatia, arrears amounted to 8% of monthly GDP at the beginning of 
1993, and had grown to some 27% by mid-1994 (Jurković and Škreb, 
1994, p. 9). 
 
Given the prevalence of illiquidity and the fear of social unrest, both 
countries avoided pushing illiquid firms through bankruptcy procedures. 
Slovenia put a moratorium on bankruptcies in the Summer of 1991; 
Croatia, informally, did something similar, not forcing any significant 
state firms into bankruptcy through 1994.7 In 1995, the problem 
remains actual in Croatia: the government set a deadline of June 30, 
1995 for state-owned companies to clear up all obligations, or face the 
possibility of bankruptcy procedures. 
 
The timing of bank rehabilitation was also affected by the stance of 
monetary policy and stabilization measures in general. While inflation 
played an important role in decreasing the real value of bad loans from 
the old system, high inflation made bank rehabilitation through 
recapitalization unwise. Any capital injected would have been 
                                                          
6 Two schools of thinking exist about the assumption of the burden of hard-
currency savings. One school argues that this was a part of the resolution of the 
issues of succession following the new states' exit from former Yugoslavia. The 
other school argues that making these liabilities public debt in fact was a form of 
bank rehabilitation. The first school focuses more on the legal aspects of the 
assumption, the other on the economic effects. 
7 The first major bankruptcy was the firm Bakar, which was actually completely shut 
down starting in early 1995. 
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immediately eroded. And simply allowing inflation to erode debts was 
far cheaper than assuming the debts through a "carve-out". 
 
Also, under conditions of high inflation, banks benefitted from very high 
spreads and used these to rebuild their balance-sheets. Thus, as the 
Croatian case shows, a degree of self-rehabilitation was possible. 
 
Some countries, particularly Russia and some of the other former Soviet 
republics, have chosen to simply privatize banks under conditions of 
high inflation, figuring that inflation would remove the stock problem, 
while rapid privatization would end the flow problem (Borish, Long and 
Noël, 1995). However, given the cautious approach to bankruptcy 
adopted in Slovenia and Croatia, and both countries' aversion to rapid 
privatization, such a solution was not advisable. 
 
For these reasons, bank rehabilitation in Slovenia and Croatia really 
only made sense once a stable macroeconomic environment had been 
achieved. In Slovenia, this was true by late 1992; in Croatia, mid-1994 
would probably have been the earliest date that bank restructuring 
could have been on the agenda. 
 
THE BANK RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM IN SLOVENIA 
 
Institutional and Legal Aspects of Restructuring 
 
A Slovene Bank Restructuring Agency was set up in 1992. Initial 
legislation was passed on October 1991, and follow-up legislation was 
passed in August 1992. 
 
The establishment of the BRA was part of a broad effort to create the 
legal and regulatory structure for a market-oriented banking sector. 
This effort includes the following legislation: 
 
--The establishment of the Bank of Slovenia as the country's central 
bank. The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia is appointed for a six year 
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term, and is responsible to a board of experts independent of political 
affiliation. The Bank can only lend to government on a temporary basis 
in an amount up to 5% of the government budget. 
 
--Laws on bank supervision giving the Bank of Slovenia authority to 
exercise oversight on the basis of internationally-accepted principles. 
 
--Regulation of bank ownership and lending practices prohibiting any 
one owner from holding more than 30% of a bank's capital, and 
prohibiting banks from making loans to any client in excess of 30% of 
the bank's total guaranteed capital. 
 
--Regulations establishing the BIS capital-adequacy standards, and 
setting minimum capital requirements. 
 
Within this framework, the Agency had the mandate of managing banks 
that were declared insolvent by the Bank of Slovenia. Insolvency 
occurred automatically if a banks losses exceeded 50% of its capital. In 
such cases, the Bank was taken-over by the government. The Agency 
would then bring in new management, and replace the bad loan 
portfolio of the bank with government bonds. Not all the banks bad 
debts would be assumed, however. Current losses would be written off 
against bank equity, and the minimum level of capital would be 
restored by the Agency. Some DEM 2.2 billion were allocated for this 
purpose, with the bad debts replaced by 30-year bonds paying 8%, 
denominated in DEM (Voljč, 1994). 
 
In addition, the Government issued bonds with to cover frozen hard-
currency accounts. Some 836.6 million DEM worth of bonds were given 
to banks, paying 5% interest annually and with 30-year maturity, while 
citizens were issued some 96.5 million DEM, again with 5% interest but 
only a 10-year maturity (Borak, 1995). 
 
Finally, the Government also issued bonds to banks that had loans to 
the Slovenian steel industry. While this was not part of the formal bank 
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rehabilitation program, it provided important help to 4 banks not under 
rehabilitation. The bonds were worth 250 million DEM, with the same 





The first bank taken over by the agency was Slovenia's largest, 
Ljubljanska Banka. The take-over began on January 1, 1993. A new 
President and CEO was appointed. Some 1 billion DEM of bad loans 
were replaced by government bonds. A program of divestment was 
begun, seeking to sell off real estate holdings and overseas branches 
deemed unnecessary to the banks strategy. The bank began to 
consolidated its lending portfolios, improved collection efforts, and 
reoriented its lending towards prime clients (Voljč, 1994). 
 
Ljubljanska Banka's liabilities stemming from the old hard-currency 
savings were cleared up. Customers of the bank were offered a choice 
of government bonds, LB bonds, or eventual repayment. Accounts 
worth some 280 million DEM were dealt with in this way (Ljubljanska 
Banka, 1993). 
 
Help also came from the Bank of Slovenia and Ministry of Finance. 
Ljubljanska Banka received liquidity credits at special rates (4.5 index 
points lower than the inter-bank rate), had its statutory foreign 
exchange minimum lowered, and was relieved of its reserve 
requirements. These concessions were gradually reduced as the 
rehabilitation process went on (BRA 1994, p. 11). 
 
The extent of the BRAs involvement in the affairs of banks under 
rehabilitated was quite great. Any credits over 3% of guaranteed 
capital had to be approved by the Agency. The Agency has also 
become involved in the restructuring of real sector non-paying bank 
clients. Slovenia's bank restructuring program relies very heavily on 
government guidance. 
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Two smaller, regionally important banks--Kreditna Banka Maribor and 
Kreditna Banka Nova Gorica, were also taken over by the agency in 
1993, receiving similar aid and concessions. Together, the three banks 
in rehabilitation accounted for some 50% of the Slovene banking 
industry's total assets, and 40% of total deposits (Voljč, 1994, p. 7). 
 
An important issue within the bank rehabilitation process was the 
conflict between the Privatization Agency, which had started to work 
before the BRA, and the BRA. The PA tried to get maximum debt write-
offs for its firms, while the BRA counselled banks not to accept write-
offs. An Agency council was set up in summer 1993, including the 
Minister of Finance, Governor of the Bank of Slovenia, Minister of 
Economy, and head of the BRA, to try to coordinate Agency policy with 
monetary policy in particular and economic policy in general. This 
structure, however, did not really overcome the tensions between the 
privatization authorities and the BRA. 
 
Another issue in the Slovene program was the question of who should 
be responsible for the work-out of the bad loans. Officials of the BRA 
were interested in forming their own loan recovery department (author 
interview with BRA, Ljubljana, July 1993), while others favored allowing 
the banks themselves to set up loan recovery departments. The 
solution adopted, which requires the banks themselves to establish 
"Emergency Care Units", had the attraction of giving banks experience 
in work-out. As Sundararajan and Balino (1993, p. 32) point out, this 
solution also provides stronger incentives for debtors to repay, since 
they have an ongoing relation with the bank. Furthermore, the bank 
possess more information about the debtor, and therefore be in a 
better position to reach a work-out plan. 
 
On the other hand, the same banks that had failed to accomplish work-
out in the past were now entrusted with it again, critics could argue. 
Furthermore, since one of the key problems of Slovene (and former 
Yugoslav) banking had been the overly close relationship between 
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banks and enterprises, this solution had the drawback of allowing such 
relations to continue to some extent. 
 
Results of the Program 
 
Overall, the Slovenian program appears to have been successful. Both 
banks in rehabilitation achieved positive profits in 1993, and all three 
appear to have achieved positive profits in 1994. However, preliminary 
analysis of cash flow showed losses for both Ljubljanska Banka and 
Kreditna Banka Maribor in 1993 (BRA, 1994, p. 13-14). 
 
The rehabilitated banks also achieved acceptable capital-adequacy 
levels. Ljubljanska Banka's capital adequacy level of 5.4% remained 
below the 8% BIS standard at the end of 1993, but by late 1994, after 
LB had been divested of remaining claims on former Yugoslavia and 
relaunched as "Nova Ljubljanska Banka", capital adequacy reached 
9.2% (Lah, 1994). Kreditna Banka Maribor achieved 13% by the end of 
1993. When the BRA proposed merging KBM with the other bank under 
rehabilitation, KBNG, the merger was expected to result in a bank with 
12% capital adequacy (BRA, 1994b). 
 
Another positive indicator is the improvement in the quality of the loan 
portfolios of LB and KBM In the period from July 19 to December 31, 
1993, some 88.8% of credits approved by LB could be classified as 
grade A or B, and 89.0% of KBM credits could be so classified (BRA, 
1994, p. 8). Considering that at the end of 1992, only 59% of LB assets 
merited such classification, this is a major step forward. (Interview with 
Miča Karpe, Ljubljanska Banka, June 1993). 
 
In addition, interest rates have fallen noticeably since early 1993. LB 
interest rates on credits fell from 20.0% in January 1993 to 12.5% in 
December 1993 in real terms, while KBM rates fell from 16.0% to 
13.0% (BRA, p. 10). The impact of this decrease is seen in Bank of 
Slovenia data, which show interest rates for all banks falling from 
24.6% (real) in January 1993 to 16.3% in November 1994 for short-
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term loans, and from 27.2% to 17% for long-term loans (Bank of 
Slovenia Bulletin, November 1994). 
 
The positive results of lower interest rates can be seen in lower spreads 
between deposit and lending rate. As graph 1 shows, spreads fell 
substantially in April 1993, and continued to fall throughout 1993 and 
1994. Starting at a very high level of 20 percent, spreads have moved 
to the 6-8 percent range, indicating a far more bearable cost of credit. 
 
 
Efforts to collect bad debts have also been a significant part of the 
rehabilitation program. Štiblar notes that LB has successfully used the 
method of debt-equity swap in several instances. (Štiblar, 1994a, p. 7-
8) This approach has its drawbacks: as Borish, Long and Noël (1995, p. 
21-22) note, such swaps put future liquidity at risk, and may further tie 
the bank to bad customers. However, as the same authors indicate, 
such swaps may offer promising enough returns in the cases where 
they do turn out well to justify the risk. And, as Štiblar indicates, the 
alternatives are few. 
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Despite the success of rehabilitation, there has been a significant 
amount of disintermediation in Slovenia. The real value of bank credits 
to enterprises increased only 1.9% between December 1991 and 
December 1994, and it even fell 7.4% between December 1993 and 
December 1994.8 Looking at graph 2, it appeared that disintermediation 
was especially strong in the first half of 1992, when the demand shocks 
of stabilization and the loss of markets in former Yugoslavia hit 
enterprises hard. Lending resumed in the second half of 1992 and grew 
steadily in until the second half of 1993. Lending grew slowly in the 
second half of 1993, and actually fell in real terms in 1994. 
 
A similar story can be told by calculating changes in the stock of credit 
as a fraction of GDP. In relation to GDP, the net change in bank credits 
to the enterprise sector fell from 8.3% of GDP in 1992 to 6.7% in 1993 
to 1.5% in 1994.9 The growth in this measure in 1992 is clearly due to 
increases in the second half of the year. 
                                                          
8 Author's calculation based on data from Bank of Slovenia Bulletin. Bernanke and 
Lown (1991) dispute the usefulness of measures of real credit, arguing that the 
increase in nominal credits is a better indicator of new credit activity. By this 
measure, there was some credit expansion in Slovenia in 1994: credits to the 
nonbank sector expanded from 291,370 million tolars to 319,113 million tolars 
(9.5% growth). 
However, this measure presumes that enterprises needs for funds are not constant 
in real terms. If, as seems more likely, enterprises need funds in order to meet 
expenses that also grow with inflation, this measure may only tell us that banks 
were lending, but not whether enterprises were keeping up their financial positions. 
Hence, the two measures in the text are to he preferred. 
9 This calculation takes the difference between total stocks of credit on December 
31 of the year in question and December 31 of the previous year divided by 
nominal GDP. Data from Bank of Slovenia Bulletin. 
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A decrease in the extension of credit is to be expected as banks 
become aware of the need to stand on their own. With harder budget 
constraints, banks should avoid making questionable loans. In a 
recessionary economic environment, good customers are hard to find, 
and the volume of loans declines. Dittus (1994) argues that similar 
decreases in credit extension signalled changes in bank behavior in 
Hungary, Poland and former Czechoslovakia after the bad debt problem 
was made a topic of public discussion and action in 1992. 
 
Before concluding that banks changed behavior, we should examine 
whether the decrease in lending to enterprises could be due to the 
government budget attracting bank funds away from enterprise 
lending. The table below suggests that this may have been the case in 
the first half of 1992, when government savings fell by 2.4% of GDP. 
However, government borrowing cannot account for the fall in lending 
in 1994, since government savings only decreases by .6% of GDP, 
while borrowing falls by 5.2% of GDP from 1993. 
 217
Further evidence on the demand for credit can be gleaned from the 
behavior of investment. Investment fell by 1.6% of GDP in 1992, before 
bank restructuring, in the course of the twin stabilization and separation 
demand shocks. Investment actually increased .5% of GDP in 1993, 
even with government savings steady. And in 1994, investment moved 
ahead again by 1.8% of GDP, while government savings decreased only 
.5% of GDP.  
 
 
Table 2 provides some basic indicators of the performance of Slovene 
banks that shed more light on the behavior of real credit. The behavior 
of ROA shows the heavy impact of the loss of the Yugoslav market on 
Slovene banks in 1992. Decreasing loans in relation to deposits, 
increasing provisions, and large write-offs in 1992 show the banks' 
reaction to the crisis. Note that is only in 1993 that provisioning really 
jumps, indicating again a change in behavior. 
 
The growth indicators are in nominal terms Since inflation was 201 in 
1992, and 32.3% in 1993, it becomes clear that assets, loans and 
deposits actually decreased in real terms in 1992, but grew again in 
1993. On the other hand, securities holdings grew very rapidly in both 
years, becoming a major part of the balance sheet. Here the stories of 
1992 and 1993 are different: in 1992, banks invested in marketable 
short-term securities. This supports the crowding-out hypothesis to a 
degree. But in 1993, the growth in securities is mainly due to the 
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issuing of long-term rehabilitation bonds, and does not in any way 




Hence, although there is some evidence for "crowding-out" in the first 
half of 1992, it seems unlikely that the slowdown in lending in 1993 and 
the fall in lending in 1994 can be explained either by "crowdingout" or 
by declining investment demand. In fact, it seems that decreased 
lending occurred hand-in-hand with increased investment, indicating 
that firms were better able to finance current needs from their own 
resources. 
 
Graph 3, which shows the real value of liquid funds available to 
enterprises, sheds some light on this phenomenon. It appears that as 
enterprise liquidity improved significantly in 1994, enterprises became 
less reliant on credit. The simultaneous increase in fixed investment 




A more precise explanation of changes in credit can be gleaned from 
econometric modelling of the demand for real credit. Using a simple 
partial adjustment model based on Sundararajan and Balino (1991) 
(see Appendix for details), the following results are obtained for the 




As expected, demand for real credit depends strongly on inflation and 
the stock of lagged real credits. More importantly, these results show 
the insensitivity of loan demand in Slovenia to interest rates. The very 
low t-value is a strong sign of the presence of distress borrowing. In 
addition, the weak link between borrowing and real GDP reinforces the 
importance of distress borrowing. Finally, the dummy for 1994 clearly 
shows a decrease in loan demand following bank rehabilitation. 
 
An alternative specification using a slope dummy for interest rates in 
1994 were examined. However, the results revealed that regressions 
with an intercept dummy, rather than a slope dummy, performed 
better. The interpretation must be that the demand curve shifted down 
in 1994, indicating a tighter attitude towards lending by banks, and 
more caution in borrowing by enterprises. In other words, the 
econometric evidence supports the conclusion drawn from the decrease 
in net credits/GDP from 1992 to 1993, and from 1993 to 1994, that 
hardening of budget constraints on banks and enterprises has taken 
place, along with greater reliance on self-finance by enterprises, 
especially in 1994. 
 
Concentration and Competition 
 
In addition to the problems dealt with by rehabilitation, Slovenia's 
banking sector faces problems of high concentration, both in the 
aggregate and at the regional levels. The five largest banks control 
63% of total assets, 32% of capital, and 59% of deposits (Štiblar, 
1994c). A new regulation requiring that banks have a minimum capital 
of DEM 50 million for a full international license goes into effect in 
September 1995; this will have the effect of increasing concentration 
even further. Štiblar worries that this will put Slovenia beyond the 
upper bound of acceptable concentration. 
 
The Bank of Slovenia believes, however, that this law is necessary to 
strengthen banks for European competition, given the presence of 
strong scale economies and the disadvantages of "excessive" 
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competition. In addition, a Bank of Slovenia official interviewed by the 
author cautioned that traditional concentration indices may be 
misleading, given Slovenia's small size and high degree of openness.10 
 
In this regard, it is important to ask whether the competition brought 
about by the entry of new banks has proved helpful. In fact, it seems 
that newly formed, private or socially-owned smaller banks have 
chosen to be "free-riders", taking advantage of high spreads rather 
than exerting competitive pressure to reduce spreads (Voljč, 1994). 
Furthermore, the fact that spreads have been so high have probably 
reduced incentives to cut costs or develop a broader range of bank 
services (Cetinski, 1994). The question, however, is what happens as 
spreads decrease. It seems reasonable to expect that the new entrants 
would provide continued competitive pressure, help introduce new 
services, and keep the big banks on their toes. Glogovšek (1994), 
criticizing the Bank of Slovenia's decision to raise minimum capital 
requirements beyond the levels required by the EU, argues that in fact 
the playing field is already tilted in favor of the banks in rehabilitation. 
These banks receive preferential treatment via the BRA and 
concessions on interest rates from the BOS. 
 
On the other hand, the belief in scale economies in banking remains 
strong. And Cetinski, analyzing the reasons behind the Slovene banking 
system's relatively high costs, argues that the system possesses 
significant excess capacity due to the large number of banks and bank 
branches. Cetinski also mentions poor use of bank technology, 
overstaffed accounting departments (a legacy of the accounting 
complications of socialism), flight of savings to foreign banks, and poor 
use of cadre in development and information systems departments as 
reasons for high costs (Cetinski, 1994). 
 
                                                          
10 Interview with Marko Kranjec, Vice-Governor of the Bank of Slovenia, Ljubljana, 
May 1995. 
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Given these problems, alliances with foreign partners may be more 
helpful than competition from many new banks. Foreign partners could 
play a major role in introducing new technology, improving 
management methods, increasing public confidence, and giving Slovene 
banks access to international financial markets (Štiblar, 1994b). 
 
A final factor in the equation may simply be the desire to secure the 
position of the rehabilitated banks. After the merger of KBM and KBNG, 
there will only be 2 rehabilitated banks, but there will also very likely be 
only 4 or 5 banks surviving the minimum capital level increase. 
 
It will be interesting to compare the cost-effectiveness of Slovene banks 
after the minimum capital requirement goes into effect to other banking 
systems. It seems that Slovenia will have to decisively open its banking 
system to strong competition from the EU to justify its somewhat 
unusual approach. 
 
Finally, Slovenia hopes to pass a new, expanded banking law in 1995. 
The law is part of a larger effort to ensure a clear and rigorous 
regulatory framework for banking in Slovenia. For the most part, the 
draft law appears to fill out and improve existing law without making 
major new innovations. 
 
Issues for the Future 
 
With regard to the success of bank rehabilitation, the final proof of the 
pudding will be the privatization of the three failed banks. The original 
intention was to privatize the banks by 1996. It remains to be seen 
whether this will be possible. There are three major question marks: 
 
(1) Have the banks improved their current operations and their 
balance-sheets enough to be attractive to investors? Continued 




Also, the rehabilitated banks have enormous disparities between the 
time structures of assets and liabilities which make them vulnerable to 
market shocks (BRA, 1994, p. 7). In particular, Štiblar argues that the 
30-year bonds are not adequate assets, and should be refinanced with 
shorter instruments denominated in tolars (Štiblar, 1994c). 
 
(2) The second big question is who will buy the shares of these banks. 
Slovene authorities will probably keep some shares. They would like to 
find shareholders among enterprises and citizens, avoiding the old 
problem of bank clients owning the banks. Slovene authorities have 
been wary of foreign banks, and probably would not permit them to 
gain control of any of the three rehabilitated banks. More attractive 
would be the idea of finding strategic foreign partners, who would hold 
a minority interest (Borak, 1994). Five banks with majority foreign 
ownership functioned in Slovenia by the end of 1993, and foreign banks 
held about 9% of total bank capital (Štiblar, 1994b). 
 
(3) Currently, Slovenian banks are highly liquid in foreign exchange, but 
often illiquid in tolars. The Bank of Slovenia, faced with the need to 
keep control of monetary aggregates so as to continue to reduce 
inflation, cannot afford to provide too much tolar liquidity. But there is 
no other source: the interbank market is simply inadequate. This may 
simply be a structural problem of a small monetary area that can only 
be partially alleviated by economic growth and recovery. 
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BANK CRISIS AND RESTRUCTURING IN CROATIA 
 
Institutional and Legal Aspects 
 
Croatia made a promising start cleaning up its banking system in 1991. 
In that year, loss-making enterprises were given government bonds 
(the so-called "big bonds") which they used in part to pay off their bad 
debts to banks. (Enterprises could also sell the bonds to the 
government in exchange for equity positions in the enterprises.) The 
total sum of bonds was near $1 billion--a rather significant sum in 
comparison with total company assets of $7-8 billion. 
 
In addition, the freezing of citizens' foreign exchange accounts, and the 
promise that the government would ultimately be responsible for these 
liabilities, greatly eased the situation of the banks. Some $2 billion of 
bonds were issued for this purpose, with repayment beginning in mid-
1992 in local currency or mid-1995 in foreign currency. Repayment by 
bond would occur over a 10-year period, with 5% interest. The bonds 
were held by the banks, but depositors could exchange their deposits 
for the bonds, which could then be used to buy socially-owned housing 
or shares in state-owned enterprises. 
 
As Škreb remarks, these steps improved the situation on paper quite 
rapidly: enterprises were able to remove their bad debts and raise their 
capital, banks removed bad loans and had safe assets in their portfolio, 
and in principle did not have to worry about a large fraction of their 
liabilities (Škreb, 1994). However, since the government often did not 
pay its obligations to the banks on time, and sometimes did not pay 
them in cash, the actual liquidity and solvency of the banks could be 
questioned. The irony here is that the National Bank rated Croatian 
Banks extremely healthy, basing its appraisal on the fact that nearly 




Inflation also helped rehabilitate Croatian banks to a degree. Inflation 
decreased the real value of bad loans, and brought the percentage of 
bad loans in the balance sheet down. Furthermore, deposit rates did 
not keep up with inflation, and spreads rose tremendously during the 
high inflation of 1992 and 1993. (See below for more details on 
spreads.) 
 
During 1994, credits of some 240 million kung (nearly 60 million DEM) 
were given to three regional banks. These credits were repaid at the 
end of 1994. Repayment was facilitated by the Ministry of Finance's 
repurchase of an equivalent sum of outstanding big bonds. This move 
was deemed necessary as an interim step to avoid bank failures during 
the period of preparation for rehabilitation. However, there is a danger 
of moral hazard, and of expectations that future bailouts will be 
forthcoming. 
 
Recent legal initiatives in Croatia have established a broad operational 
framework for banks, and have laid much of the legal groundwork for 
rehabilitation. They include the following: 
 
--the law on the National Bank of Croatia, which gives the Governor a 
six-year term, creates a Board of Experts independent of political 
parties, and limits lending to the government to "bridging loans" that 
must be repaid within the fiscal year and cannot exceed 5% of the 
budget. 
 
--the law on Banks and Savings Banks, which sets a minimum equity 
capital of 5 million DEM in domestic currency equivalent for a domestic 
license, and 15 million DEM in domestic currency equivalent for an 
unlimited license, defines capital-adequacy standards compatible with 
BIS requirements, limits any single loan to 30% of liable capital (tier 1 
plus tier 2 capital), limits loans to any single borrower to 30% of liable 
capital, and limits investments in land, buildings, equipment, and 
ownership stakes in other banks and enterprises to 70% of liable 
capital. Amendments in February 1995 limit loans to any client with 
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shareholding stakes above 10% in the bank to 5% of liable capital.11 
(Škreb, 1994, p. 10-11) 
 
--the law on the State Agency for Deposit Insurance and Bank 
Rehabilitation was passed in May 1994, but the government only 
announced its choice to head the agency in March 1995. With the help 
of a World Bank loan, the agency is expected to be functioning in the 
second half of 1995. 
 
Two other recent measures taken by the National Bank of Croatia have 
intensified pressure on banks to conform to market discipline. The first, 
called "dvostruka pokrića" (double coverage), requires that both the 
user making a payment and the bank in which the user holds an 
account be solvent. The point is that customers must be sure their bank 
is solvent; if not, payments will not be made. This encourages 
customers to worry about the solvency of their banks. 
 
The second measure makes it impossible for banks to automatically 
draw on their required reserves at the National Bank. Banks that are 
illiquid have to take out an "Interventive Credit", which not only carries 
a penalty interest rate, but also cannot even be used until the banks' 
obligations have been settled. 
 
What is still lacking is a clear legal framework for bankruptcy, the use 
of collateral, and trading in securities. Privatization legislation is also in 
some respects still unfinished. The latter aspect will be discussed 
further below. 
 
                                                          
11 In cases where loans to large shareholders exceed this limit, the law requires 
that no new loans be given until repayment has proceeded to the point where loans 
are less than 5% of liable capital. This limit will probably affect small banks more 
than large ones; the biggest banks currently have no shareholders with 10% 
shares. 
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Coping with a Problematic Environment 
 
Due to the war and the failure of the Croatian authorities to supervise 
enterprise performance after the balance sheet clean-up of 1991, flow 
problems re-emerged. Enterprises did not change their ways of doing 
business in many cases, and banks, still owned by large state-run 
enterprises, continued to lend to them. Below, I will discuss the reasons 
for the slow progress of privatization and restructuring in Croatia. In 
this section, I will concentrate on the performance of banks themselves. 
 
Even though Croatian banks were formally solvent, bad loans grew 
again. By late 1994, the problem seemed almost as bad as before. 
Potential losses in the banking system were estimated at a staggering 
64.2°/o of total capital, and four medium-sized banks were in urgent 
need of help (Prskalo, 1994c). 
 
This figure belied the optimistic impression generated by the fact that 
overall capital-adequacy in Croatian banking was rated at 17% in 1993. 
The 17% capital-adequacy is misleading for several reasons. First, 
because much of the existing capital will have to be written-down 
during rehabilitation. Second, because the tactic of converting bad 
loans to equity has not succeeded in generating income, only in 
removing problems from sight. Third, because small banks are actually 
overcapitalized, and would be happy to increase loans if only they could 
increase their deposit base. Fourth, because replacing loans with bonds 
automatically increases risk-weighted capital adequacy, since bonds 
have a lower risk weight than even loans to the best customers. 
 
The problems of Croatia's distressed banks include excessive exposure 
to particular loss-making industries, and problems created by war 
losses. Also, Croatia's banks are highly focused regionally, and certain 
regions--most notably Slavonia-Baranja, Dalmatia, the Croatian coast 
and Istria--have been especially affected by war damage,  disruption of 
transportation links, and loss of traditional markets. As a result, the 
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banks serving these regions have found themselves in especially 
difficult positions (Gracin (1994), Prskalo (1994c)). 
 
Banks' reaction to such problems has not been completely passive; 
banks have adjusted to some extent. Among the survival tactics 
employed are: 
 
Improved credit-risk assessment: Many Croatian banks have made 
important steps forward in assessing the credit-worthiness of borrowers 
and attempting to improve their loan portfolios. Credit-risk assessment 
remains difficult, however, due to lack of credit history information, the 
newness of many borrowers, and the unpredictability of the economic 
situation.12 
 
Greater efforts to secure deposits: Increased advertising, the 
introduction of ATM's, and attempts to improve bank services indicate 
increased efforts to woo customers. However, as the next section 
shows, these efforts are only beginning. 
Debt-equity swaps: Some banks have aggressively pursued equity in 
place of bad loans from companies with very limited financial prospects. 
As was pointed out above, this tactic at least has the virtue of removing 
non-performing assets from the balance sheets, and it makes the 
likelihood of enterprise turn-around better. But trading nonperforming 
loans for equities in distressed firms does not create much income 
(Prskalo, 1994a). 
 
Initiation of bankruptcy: Slavonska Banka, for example, was 
involved in no less than 34 bankruptcy cases between 1990 and 1993. 
At stake were 111 million DEM of loans. But only 3 86 million had been 
recovered by the beginning of 1994. 
                                                          
12 These observations are based on interviews with Croatian hankers and hank 
supervision officials. 
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Conversion of old hard-currency savings: Some banks have been 
aggressive in their efforts to decrease their stocks of old hard-currency 
savings. Zagrebačka Banka, in particular, has made special efforts in 
this regard, including offering to buy old hard-currency savings at a 
discount. The bank announced in early 1995 that it had reached the 
point where new hard-currency savings was greater than old hard-
currency savings. Other banks, too, have reduced their old hard-
currency savings holdings noticeably. 
 
Investment banking: The most noteworthy, and controversial 
investment bank is Privredna Banka Zagreb, which had holdings in 
some 70 enterprises with a total value of 990 million DEM as of the end 
of 1994. The majority of these were obtained from enterprises in 
bankruptcy (Drezga, 1995). However, Privredna Banka has been forced 
to put much of this portfolio up for sale in spring 1995, due to a sharp 
liquidity crisis. 
 
Controversy about Privredna Banka's investments has focused on its 
strong ties with enterprises dating back to the old system, and its close 
ties to politicians (Kiseljak, 1995b). Be that as it may, the point still 
stands that many Croatian banks are taking considerable equity 
positions in enterprises, and play important roles in both financial and 
physical restructuring of enterprises. 
 
Competition and Spreads 
 
Croatia's banking system, like Slovenia's, has a high level of 
concentration. Although some 50 banks operate, two, Zagrebačka and 
Privredna, hold 39.7% of banking system capital and 70.6% of credits 
disbursed. When the next four banks--all regional leaders--are added 
in, the figures rise to 66.1 % and 88.2% respectively (Škreb, 1994). 
 
Regional concentration levels are very high. Hence, the aggregate 
concentration levels probably understate concentration levels at the 
regional level. Also, the high share of Zagrebačka and Privredna 
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nationally reflects the greater economic health of Zagreb and the north-
west region of the country, which have been relatively untouched by 
the war.13 
 
An important symptom of non-competitive behavior in banking is the 
enormous disparities in interest rates across banks. Deposit rates on 
kuna savings ranged from 1 to 7% annually in early 1995 for sight 
deposits, and from 8 to 16% for 36-month time deposits. Deposit rates 
on hard-currency savings were equally varied, ranging from 1 % to 7% 
(Privredni Vjesnik, 1995). 
 
Similarly, there were wide differences in loan rates and conditions. 
Some banks required applicants not only to provide collateral and show 
that they had a third of the value of the loan in cash, but also to 
establish accounts in the bank before considering loan applications 
(Popović, 1994). 
 
Stabilization has resulted in significant decreases in spreads. During the 
high inflation of 1992 and 1993, spreads reached astronomical levels. 
Stabilization reduced these, and by March 1994 spreads were down to 
the 15% range. By late 1994, spreads were down as low as 10.7%--still 
high, but a far cry from the hundreds of percentage point spreads of 
1993 (see Graphs 4 and 5). 
 
                                                          
13 I owe this insight to Damir Odak. 
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Spreads remain high for the following reasons: 1) large amounts of 
non-performing loans 2) other "inactive" assets on the balance sheet, 
including a relatively high reserve requirement (27%) that receives very 
modest interest rates (5.2% per annum in 1995) 3) high costs due to 
inefficient operations 4) strong legal protection of debtors, which 
prevents foreclosure and results in a risk premium being charged to all 
borrowers.14 
 
Partly because of lower spreads, banking sector performance in the first 
half of 1994 deteriorated quite badly, despite the success of 
macrostabilization. Bank profits fell from 1.26 billion Kuna in the first six 
months of 1993 to .396 billion in the first six months of 1994, and 
losses rose from 14 million to 288 million. Net before tax profit fell from 
1.25 billion to 107 million kuna (Privredni Vjesnik, 1994).15 
 
On the one hand, the highly imperfect market conditions obtaining 
provided opportunities for new entries. In such a market it is relatively 
easy and profitable to free-ride on high spreads and build up a new 
bank. The continued existence of some 50 banks after 5 years of 
unrestricted entry supports this assertion. 
 
On the other hand, the enormous advantages held by the existing big 
banks, including well-developed branch networks and significant capital 
resources, constitute important competitive advantages. It remains to 
be seen whether the new banks can continue to decrease the market 
share of the leading banks and establish meaningful competition. 
 
Croatia, like Slovenia, faces the issue of to whom the banks can be 
sold. Croatian law, like Slovenian law, now limits the ownership role of 
firms in banks, and also limits the credit exposure of banks to individual 
borrowers. However, the disposable savings of the population in Croatia 
is probably much lower than in Slovenia, due to war and the sale of 
                                                          
14 Santini (1995) speculates that the risk premium explains anywhere from one-
third to one-half of overall interest rates. 
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socially-owned housing. And, so far, there is only one foreign bank 
active in Croatia. Most likely, Croatia will encourage foreign banks to 
enter in some form. Croatian emigres and former guestworkers may be 
a source of capital, but this remains to be seen. 
 
Demand for Credit in Croatia 
 
The enormous losses suffered by the Croatian economy due to war, as 
well as the ongoing problems of bad loans, led to a noticeable 
contraction of real credit, as can be seen in graph 6 below. Real credits 
held by enterprises fell steadily from mid-1992 until November 1993. 
 
After stabilization, however, real credits began to rise. In part, this 
increase can be explained by monetary tightening As the National Bank 
of Croatia stopped automatically buying up foreign currency from 
enterprises, the latter were forced to borrow more to finance their 
liquidity needs. This is seen in the fact, noted above, that inter-
enterprise arrears tripled in the months after stabilization. 
 
In addition, the faster-than-anticipated fall in inflation may have 
resulted in continued growth in nominal credits, as enterprises  
projected their liquidity needs based on higher inflation than actually 
obtained, leading to growth in real credits. 
 
To study these issues further, I have estimated the demand for credit 
in Croatia from July 1992 to April 1994 using the same general 
framework employed above. 
                                                                                                                                      
15 These figures cover all banks, savings banks and other financial institutions. 
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These results give a picture of an economy characterized by distress 
borrowing. The coefficient on interest on loans is insignificant, 
indicating that rising interest rates do not curtail real demand for 
credits. The other coefficients are more usual: negative and significant 
effect of inflation and partial adjustment of lagged credits. The 
insignificance of the of industrial production may result from the fact 
that it is only a proxy for GDP. 
 
Two things should be said about the demand curve before and after 
stabilization. First, separate tests showed that stabilization did not 
affect the interest-sensitivity of real credit demand; distress borrowing 
continued after stabilization. Also, although the dummy for the effect of 
stabilization on the constant term is negative and significant at 10%, in 
fact the demand curve shifted up in credit-interest rate space, because 
the fall in monthly inflation rates from 38 to 0, when multiplied by the 
coefficient on inflation, is actually greater than the shift captured by the 
dummy. 
 
In conclusion, this econometric exercise indicates a credit market in 
Croatia dominated by distress borrowing on the demand side. Banks 
are forced to accommodate this. Stabilization, by reducing the inflation 
variable, shifted the demand curve upward. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK REHABILITATION  
AND REAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION 
 
Neither Slovenia nor Croatia had privatized the majority of enterprises 
by the beginning of 1995. In Slovenia, a drawn-out legislative debate, 
involving three different versions of the privatization legislation, was 
only settled in November 1992. (See Štiblar (1992), Cvikl, Kraft and 
Vodopivec (1993), Rus (1994) and Pleskovič and Sachs (1994)). 
Enabling legislation was passed in summer and fall 1993, and the 
distribution of vouchers and the formation of investment funds began in 
1994. By early 1995, most enterprises had submitted privatization 
plans, and the process was expected to conclude in 1996. 
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This lag in mass privatization did not completely prevent restructuring 
from occurring. New private firms grew vigorously. Social ownership fell 
from 89% to 76% of the economy between 1990 and 1993 (Vodopivec 
and Korze, 1993) Social sector enterprises, expecting changes to come, 
created new business plans, and shed labor at a very rapid rate. Some 
102,000 social sector jobs (not including government) disappeared 
between 1989 and 1991, and another 120,000--20.8% of the total--
were eliminated between 1991 and 1994.16 17 
 
In Croatia, although enterprises went through an ownership change 
process. the result was often not privatization. By the end of 1994, 
some 2364 privatization plans had been completely carried out. Of 
these. 47 6% resulted in complete privatization, but completely private 
firms accounted for only 2 billion of the 22.1 billion DEM of total capital. 
On the other hand, 376 enterprises remain with majority state 
ownership, and these account for 9.2 billion of the 22.1 billion DEM. In 
addition. some 863 enterprises are minority owned by the Croatian 
Privatization Fund When the CPF's holdings are combined with those of 
the Pension and Invalid Funds, they probably are adequate to provide 
the CPF effective control over these firms as well These firms have 
some 10 9 billion DEM capital. with an average firm capital of 12.7 
million (Data from CPF. quoted in Prošenski, 1994). 
 
Further privatization has been attempted by limited offerings of stock 
on the Zagreb stock exchange About 40 million DEM had been sold this 
way by late 1994, although the CPF was offering shares in some 460 
firms with a total value of 1 9 billion DEM. In addition, the CPF was 
selling shares in another 60 firms in exchange for old hardcurrency 
savings. The CPF had succeeded in exchanging shares worth 360 
                                                          
16 This figure is actually an understatement, since the 1994 employment figures 
includes private firms with more than three employees (Bank of Slovenia, 
November 1994.) 
17 Berg (1994) makes a similar arguments in the Polish case, suggesting that Polish 
enterprises began adjusting quite rapidily after the stabilization of 1990, despite the 
almost complete lack of prfvatization of larger state firms. 
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million DEM for old hard-currency savings by late 1994 (Prošenski, 
1994). 
 
Furthermore, it can be said that the extremely low level of trading in 
equities on the Zagreb stock exchange remains an obstacle to debt-
equity swaps and thus to restructuring efforts throughout the real 
sector. 
 
Behavioral Change and Restructuring 
 
Why did Slovene firms change their behavior more than Croatian firms? 
The answers probably lie in the macroeconomic and institutional 
environment. In Slovenia, tight monetary policy began in late 1991 
Even though bankruptcy was in moratorium, it was clear that loss-
makers would face great difficulties. Banks could not gain access to 
refinancing credits, real interest rates were extremely high, and most 
firms could read the writing on the wall. Only certain large and strategic 
loss-makers, like the steel industry, could count on loan forgiveness and 
other fiscal subsidies. 
 
In Croatia, however, monetary tightness really only began with the 
stabilization program in late 1993. Refinancing credits, the main 
instrument of soft monetary policy, were only eliminated completely in 
May 1994. Political struggles continue over how to rehabilitate 
important sectors like shipbuilding, and over whether the government 
will reimburse enterprises for war-related losses (Kiseljak, 1995a). 
 
In addition, the success of the old managers in keeping their positions 
has contributed to a "business as usual" situation in many of the largest 
enterprises. With war still a real possibility, and with the overwhelming 
majority of ownership in the hands of the government or its agencies 
(the Croatian Privatization Fund, and the Health and Pension Funds), 
pressure on firms to change behavior is much more limited. 
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Bank rehabilitation in Croatia will have a great deal of difficulty if state-
run firms are not restructured. Removing bad loans from bank 
portfolios is little help if current loans are not being repaid (the stock 
problem is eliminated but not the flow problem). Also, banks already 
have 59% their assets as claims on government (National Bank of 
Croatia Bulletin, January 1995, p. 1); rehabilitation through bond for 





The success of bank restructuring and real sector 
restructuring: Slovenia's bank rehabilitation appears to have been 
fairly successful. Rehabilitation seems to have contributed significantly 
to lowering real interest rates and spreads. It also seems to have 
increased the quality of bank lending, and led to important steps 
toward "hard-budget constraints." At the same time, it should be 
noticed that tightened lending criteria, continued high (but falling) 
interest rates, and greater reserve and capital requirements have kept 
banks from playing a major role in promoting growth initially. For 
example, even in 1994, when rehabilitation procedures were a year old 
in Slovenia, the real volume of credits felt over 8%. 
 
Some of the success of Slovenia's bank restructuring program should 
be attributed to the progress real-sector enterprises made in 
adjustment. Slovene banks were able to find some good customers, 
and to rebuild their loan portfolios, thanks to the significant degree of 
adjustment occurring in the real sector. Problems still remain, 
particularly the heavy weight of government paper in banks balance 
sheets, but the Slovene banking system has clearly made an important 
step forward. 
 
Although Croatian banks show some evidence of changing their 
behavior, with some banks improving credit-risk assessment and 
lending practices, and with some using bankruptcy, debt-equity swaps 
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and other tactics to salvage bad debts, their room for maneuver is 
limited by the lack of good clients, the heavy burden of bad assets, and 
the excessive weight of government paper in their balance sheets. 
 
The Croatian case suggests that a paper operation to clean balance-
sheets, even when followed by the salutary effects of inflation on any 
remaining bad loans, does not guarantee a healthy banking sector in 
the absence of restructuring of the real sector. The predominance of 
distress borrowing, confirmed by the econometric analysis above, 
points to the need to restructure the real sector at the same time as 
the banking sector to avoid continued flow problems. 
 
In addition, these cases point to the importance of supporting 
institutions such as active real estate, equity and swap markets, and 
clear, usable legal guarantees of contracts and bankruptcy. The relative 
success of Slovene bank rehabilitation suggests that privatization per se 
may not be as crucial, as long as the macroeconomic and legal 
environment supports restructuring. 
 
Problems of rehabilitation: In a small monetary area with an 
underdeveloped interbank market, liquidity management is quite 
difficult. In Slovenia and Croatia this has taken a very particular form: 
Banks are often liquid in foreign exchange, but illiquid in local currency. 
Rehabilitation also gives the banks a high proportion of illiquid assets--
particularly long-term government bonds and equities acquired in 
exchange for debt. Liquidity will remain perhaps the key issue for banks 
in both countries in the near future. 
 
Also, it is important to note that bank restructuring requires a great 
deal of political support and public resources. The Slovene program 
gave the government Agency an enormous role in the process. While 
the Slovene program may be criticized for being top-heavy, it is clear 
that the role of government in this aspect of the transition--as in many 
others--is quite important. 
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Similarly, in Croatia, bank restructuring has already required significant 
public resources. In Croatia, the question of the efficient use of these 
public resources is especially actual. One may ask: Will banks (and 
large real-sector enterprises) be forced to change their behavior in 
exchange for public funds? 
 
Bank rehabilitation is one part of this process of creating an 
environment for healthy economic growth. If the other elements are in 
place, bank rehabilitation can create healthy, prudent banks that will be 
a solid source of finance for the future. But without a supportive legal 
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